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Constitutional Political Economy: 






The eurozone crisis has been variously described in financial or in fiscal terms, caused either 
by an over-leveraged banking system or by unsustainable budget deficits and sovereign debt – 
or indeed both at once. But perhaps with the exception of Ireland and Greece, neither holds 
true for individual eurozone countries or the common currency area as a whole. The 
combined banking and sovereign debt crisis is symptomatic of a more fundamental set of 
problems that requires a structural political economy analysis. 
 
At the root of the eurozone crisis is a balance of payments disequilibrium that is connected 
with a mismatch between savings and investment, both globally and within Europe. Globally, 
emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and the Gulf built up about US$10 trillion of 
foreign reserves from 1997 to 2007 which they invested in large part in both US and 
European sovereign and corporate bonds. This historically unprecedented ‘savings glut’ 
flooded the markets with cheap money, an influx of capital that was reinforced by low interest 
rates across the whole euro area which facilitated substantially higher borrowing. 
 
In conjunction with a specific incentive structure that favoured certain sectors such as finance, 
insurance and real estate over other sectors such as high-tech manufacturing and industry, the 
ensuing monetary expansion fuelled credit and property bubbles in the USA and Europe. 
When these bubbles burst in 2008-09 amid the global ‘credit crunch’, the result was a pan-
European banking crisis that was followed from early 2010 onwards by a sovereign debt 
crisis.  
 
The mutual dependence of banks and sovereigns that had developed for a decade brought 
countries to the brink of bankruptcy and the common currency to breakup point. With banks 
holding a significant share of total sovereign bonds, governments had little choice but to bail 
out all those banking conglomerates that were ‘too big to fail’. In turn, that led to ballooning 
budget deficits, which the recession exacerbated through a combination of lower tax revenues 
and higher expenditure as a result of the automatic stabilisers. 
 
Crucially, the eurozone’s banking and sovereign debt crisis has shed light on an unsustainable 
balance of payments disequilibrium among members of the euro area that is associated with 
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long-standing trade imbalances between surplus countries at the core and deficit countries in 
the periphery. These imbalances between creditors and debtors are linked to significant 
differences in competitiveness and productivity. In turn, competitiveness and productivity 
differentials rest on a series of fundamental structural dynamics within and across eurozone 
countries, notably the evolution of wages and investment (both public and private) in capital 
equipment, R&D and training. 
 
These processes draw attention to a number of overlapping structural issues, inter alia (a) the 
connections between production and consumption activities; (b) the relative weight and 
interaction of different economic sectors; (c) the financial architecture and its relations to the 
rest of the economy; (d) debt-credit relationships and the evolution of both liquidity formation 
and utilisation (Scazzieri 2012); (e) the institutional and political framework within which 
fiscal and monetary policy is decided and implemented and how it affects the wider economy 
(Marsh 2013); (f) the impact of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on these 
(and other) factors, notably capital mobility and investment (dis)incentives. 
 
This chapter argues, first of all, that the current crisis of the eurozone can only be understood 
as part of a particular economic, political and social domain in which EMU is inscribed. The 
domain in question is not limited to a set of institutions and rules within which markets, states 
and individuals interact (Buchanan 1990) but extends to social structures that embed both 
cooperation and conflict at – as well as across – different levels (Ornaghi 1990; Pabst and 
Scazzieri 2012). As an analytical framework, constitutional political economy explores the 
multi-level dependencies that characterise economic integration within and between national 
states and transnational markets. 
 
Second, ordo-liberalism shares with constitutional political economy the idea that the 
economic field is not self-standing but rather part of the overarching social field which 
encompasses society and the state. However, ordo-liberal thinkers view the social order as 
grounded in the constitutional-legal order that subordinates social ties to state laws and 
market contract. By bracketing social relationships out of the picture, the effect of ordo-liberal 
policies – such creating the ‘framework conditions’ (Rahmenbedingungen) for perfect 
competition – is to disembed the economy from society and to re-embed social ties in 
predominantly contractual relations, which ignores the eurozone’s structural problems. 
 
Third, the dominant logic of European integration since the 1957 Rome Treaties (including 
EMU) has been neo-functionalism, which posits spill-over effects from economic 
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interdependence to political unity (Haas 1961; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1997). Analogous 
to the concept of path dependency, neo-functionalism explains why European integration has 
privileged monetary union over both a fiscal and a political union. Coupled with the influence 
of ordo-liberalism, the constitutional political economy analysis also shows how this has 
constrained both crisis management and official proposals for reform. 
 
Fourth, the European polity within which EMU is inscribed is neither a federal super-state nor 
a free-trade area but rather a political system sui generis (Hix 2005; Zielonka 2007). This 
system consists in hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, multiple membership, 
polycentric authority and multi-level governance. As a unique polity, Europe contains a 
certain set of opportunities and constraints for political and economic cooperation. These 
opportunities and constrains provide a different exit from the eurozone crisis and embed EMU 
in the social relations which provide the trust and cooperation on which a viable common 
currency depends. 
 
Section 2 briefly develops constitutional political economy as an analytical architecture to 
describe and explain the wider domain in which the eurozone crisis is inscribed. Section 3 
examines ordo-liberal principles and policy prescriptions that underpin the creation of EMU 
and the eurozone crisis management/resolution since early 2010. Section 4 provides an 
account of the (neo-)functional logic that has shaped the process of integration and the 
building of the European polity. Section 5 suggests a number of alternative pathways for the 
eurozone. 
 
2. Constitutional Political Economy: An Analytical Architecture 
 
The eurozone tends to be analysed from the perspective of either economics or political 
science. Both the economic and the political field differ on the role of markets and states or 
the relative importance of individuals and groups in the allocation and distribution of 
resources. However, the two fields view the common currency in binary terms, separating the 
economic logic of supranational integration from the political logic of national legitimacy. 
Such binary terms lead to the absorption of politics into economics or vice-versa. The former 
emphasizes the need for austerity to deal with the sovereign debt crisis, while the latter 
accentuates the case for financial reform to address the banking crisis. Despite these important 
policy differences, both fields rest on instrumental rationality, the maximisation of utility and 
a trade-off between rival interests – a zero-sun game of winners vs. losers in which conflict is 
more fundamental than cooperation (e.g. creditors vs. debtors or banks vs. taxpayers). 
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In principle, political economy differs from both economics and political science, notably by 
rejecting the separation between the two fields and also the bracketing of the social relations 
in which both are embedded.1 However, the dominant conceptions of political economy – 
including monetarist and Keynesian approaches – seem to share the same logic of 
antagonistic binary opposites that characterises economics and political science, including the 
opposition between the national political and the supranational economic level. In the case of 
EMU, monetarism and Keynesianism agree that the imbalance between a centralised 
monetary policy and nationally determined economic policy is unsustainable. That is why 
both support the creation of a eurozone-wide banking union, followed by a fiscal union and 
finally by a political union. Even though these two conceptions of political economy diverge 
on other specific policy prescriptions (most of all, austerity and stimulus or supply-side 
reforms and demand-led growth), their agreement on the solution to the eurozone crisis 
reflects a wider conceptual convergence. 
 
Indeed, the prevailing approaches to political economy view markets, states and individuals as 
foundational categories that constitute the economic-political domain. However, what remains 
unexplained is, first, why these categories are – or should be – seen as given and, secondly, on 
what type of social relations they are depend. Compared with economics and political science, 
Keynesian and monetarist political economy rejects the assumption is that states, markets and 
individuals pertain to separate, self-contained fields. But even the economic-political domain 
is conceptualised independently from the domain of social relations, i.e. the manifold and 
complex social ties that underpin both the interdependence and the interactions between 
individuals and/or groups. For this reason, the dominant approaches to political economy 
focus on the purely contractual arrangements of market and state at the expense of social 
bonds on which both trust and cooperation ultimately rely. By expanding the economic-
political field, they end up subsuming the social domain under the logic of exchange or the 
logic of power (or indeed both at once). 
 
By contrast, this chapter develops a different conception of political economy. Accordingly, 
the domain of political economy rejects not only the strict separation of economics from 
politics and other similarly antagonistic binary opposites such as state vs. market, the national 
vs. the supranational level or individual vs. collective interest. It also views social relations as 
more primary than either state-administrative or market-commercial arrangements – a                                                         
1 For arguments in this and the following paragraphs, I am indebted to conversations with Roberto Scazzieri and 
our joint work on the political economy of constitution. 
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constitutive domain that embeds the economic-political domain. Crucially, ‘constitutional 
political economy’ seeks to theorise the overarching constitution of the domain within which 
markets, states and individuals interact and the social structures in which both cooperative and 
conflictual relationships are grounded. 
 
Other scholars in the field have conceptualised the constitutional dimension of political 
economy, for example James Buchanan. According to him, the domain of constitutional 
political economy is concerned with 
the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact, 
and the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come 
into being. The emphasis on the choice of constraints distinguishes this research 
program from conventional economics, while the emphasis on cooperative rather 
than conflictual interaction distinguishes the program from much of conventional 
political science (Buchanan 1990: 1) 
 
Buchanan is right to argue that constitutional political economy differs from neo-classical 
economics and modern political science to the extent that it shifts the focus away from purely 
contractual arrangements towards the wider constitution of the domain within which 
institutions, rules and policy choices occur – notably the cooperative framework of reciprocal 
exchange in the pursuit of mutual benefit. However, Buchanan assumes that conflict is more 
primary than cooperation and he fails to account for the social ties that pre-exist both. 
Moreover, both conflict and cooperation rest on “methodological individualism and rational 
choice” (Buchanan 1990: 1), which presupposes that the ‘primary units’ of society are 
rationally driven, utility-maximizing individuals who are bound together by contractual 
arrangements after all. 
 
In the case of EMU, this ignores two dimensions: first, the hybrid, multi-level system of 
economic and monetary governance that has shaped the common currency both before and 
since the crisis. Second, the complex and multilayered social relations both within and across 
localities, regions and states. These dimensions create specific path dependencies that are 
fundamentally ambivalent. Either they can act either as factors of inertia and even failure by 
slowing down crisis management or by hindering crisis resolution. Or they can point to 
alternative possibilities in relation to both the overarching institutional architecture and 
specific policy ideas. 
 
For these reasons, the problem with Buchanan’s conception of constitutional political 
economy is that it ends up subordinating social relationships under the formal functioning of 
markets and states. Patterns of social interaction at various levels are subsumed either under 
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political relations within or between states or under economic transactions in the national or 
global marketplace. In this manner, his approach ignores more fundamental social 
connections that occur at, as well as across, different levels.  
 
The approach of this essay is different insofar as the main focus is on the social bonds that are 
underpin both conflict and cooperation. Such connections are more complex than the rather 
homogeneous, contractual links associated with either state sovereignty or global commerce 
(or again both at once). This is particular relevant for EMU, as the eurozone economy and 
polity are characterised by hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, polycentric authority 
and multi-level governance. In other words, different rules and institutions are grounded in 
different types of sociability, and the ultimate source of social interactions is civil society – 
defined as “the primary constitution of connectivity in which markets and states operate [… 
and which] embeds the causal structures determining the relationship between intended and 
unintended outcomes in any given social domain” (Pabst and Scazzieri 2012: 337-8). Applied 
to the EMU, this means that the numerous social ties that constitute the political-economic 
domain are not simply a given reality that economics and political science either ignore or 
subsume under the logic of exchange or the logic of power. These ties also point to partially 
realised connections that could give rise to a different settlement. 
 
Any given constitutional political economy presupposes the design of a specific institutional 
and organisational structure, insofar as it requires the arrangement of human actions in view 
of a particular set of objectives. Max Weber’s distinction between organisation and 
association is useful in clarifying this concept: “[a]n "organisation" (Betrieb) is a system of 
continuous purposive activity of a specified kind”, whereas the association (Verein) is “a 
corporate group originating in a voluntary agreement and in which the established order 
claims authority over the members only by virtue of a personal act of adherence” (Weber 
1947: 28). In view of this discussion, a political economy consistent with the hybrid character 
of civil society can be a specific organisation (Betrieb) embedded in a wider space of social 
connections (Verein).  
 
Here one can go further than Weber and make the point that contractualist and voluntarist 
theories ignore the pre-existing social ties into which individuals are born and which are not a 
matter of personal choice at each point in time. These ties provide both constraints and 
opportunities in relation to conflict and cooperation. Crucially, a focus on pre-existing social 
ties can overcome a series of dualisms that characterise modern political economy, including 
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the instrumental vs. the non-instrumental action, hierarchical vs. vertical interaction, intended 
vs. non-intended outcome and homogeneous vs. heterogeneous interdependence. By 
conceptualising the economic and political fields as ultimately embedded in the social 
domain, political economies of civil society offer a richer conceptualisation than those 
approaches that focus exclusively on the contractualist and voluntarist arrangements 
underpinning the institutions of states and markets. 
 
This highlights alternative conceptions of political economy. The partitioning of social reality 
into foundational categories such as individuals, markets, and states correlates with the strict 
separation of academic disciplines that characterizes the relationship between modern 
economics and modern political science. This disciplinary divide has deepened since the 
Marginalist revolution of the 1870s insofar as the theory of rational (economic or political) 
choice moved the agenda away from the classical analysis of system-wise opportunities and 
constraints and directed it firmly towards the study of the allocation of given 
resources/capabilities among alternative uses. In this manner, marginalism shifted the 
emphasis away from human agency and choice among different sets of constraints and 
opportunities. Since system-wide opportunities and constraints are associated with different 
institutional and organisational patterns that affect the division of labour and exchange, each 
system encompasses alternative political economies. Seen from this perspective, marginalism 
has reduced the choice to a single political economy. 
 
As the Italian political theorist Lorenzo Ornaghi remarks, since the end of the nineteenth 
century the body of social sciences (notably economics, politics and social theory) has 
become increasingly fragmented under the pressure of increasing autonomy and ever-greater 
specialisation, both by fields of inquiry and by analytical tools. At the same time, the 
respective ‘objects of study’ (such as the economy, the political system or society) are 
increasingly intertwined with one another. Political institutions are key in defining the 
boundaries of the economic system and its different institutional and organisation patterns 
that affect the division of labour and exchange. Crucially,  
the integrating role of political institutions appears to increase with the degree of 
complexity and organization of economic action. The relation of political 
institutions with economic structure then becomes essential for two distinct reasons. 
First, it provides a better analytical-historical perspective on the links between 
political economy and ‘political order’ (the latter is not coincident with the type of 
‘order’ that is associated with the existence of the State). Secondly, it contributes to 
a ‘dynamic’ interpretation of the contemporary relations between State institutions 
and economic order. In turn, this is the only route to an analysis emphasizing the 
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link between order and transformation in a theory of the intersections between 
economic and political cycle (Ornaghi 1990: 25). 
 
In short, the modern separation of economics from political science is correlated with a split 
between economic structures and political institutions, which has reduced the scope of 
political economy and separated the analysis of both markets and states from the social 
connections in which they are embedded. By contrast, the conception of constitutional 
political economy, which this essay seeks to develop, explores the complex links between the 
economy and the polity with a particular emphasis on different forms of sociability that 
constitute the domain within which markets, states and individuals interact. 
 
3. Ordo-liberalism and EMU 
 
From the perspective of constitutional political economy as defined in the previous section, 
ordo-liberalism is central to the debate about principles and policy pathways for EMU. Ordo-
liberal ideas have shaped the genesis of the common currency and also the responses to the 
current crisis (Allen 2005). Unlike certain strands in modern economics and political science, 
the ordo-liberal tradition – in the work of Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, Franz Böhm, Hans 
Großmann Doerh, Alexander Rüstow and Alfred Müller-Armack – does not regard the 
economic field as an autonomous, self-contained system. Instead, it shares with constitutional 
political economy (as conceived by scholars such as Buchanan) the idea that the various fields 
are interdependent (Megay 1970; Nicholls 1994). Indeed, the economic order is seen as a part 
of the overarching social order which encompasses society and the state.  
 
However, the fundamental difference compared with the conception of constitutional political 
economy to which this essay adheres is the nature of the social order. For ordo-liberal 
thinkers, the social domain rests on a fundamental dichotomy (Kolev 2010): ‘rules of the 
game’ (order) and ‘moves of the game’ (process). This distinction underpins the notion of 
‘social market economy’ that denotes the specifically German ‘variety of capitalism’ 
(Nicholls 1994; Ptak 2009) and is enshrined in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty – with the state 
defining the order (via laws and regulations) and the market driving the process (via free 
competition). The interaction between ‘order’ and ‘process’ also translates into policy 
principles: the states ensures the right ‘framework conditions’ (Rahmenbedingungen) to 
generate a market order that is both competitive and stable (in terms of prices and liquidity).  
 
Applied to the eurozone, this helps explain the stance of core, creditor countries such as 
Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland on issues such as austerity, the refusal 
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(partially or fully) to mutualise debt and supranational common rules – most notably the 2011 
fiscal pact with the automatic ‘debt brake’. Crucially, the ordo-liberal conception of 
constitutional political economy, which shapes policy on EMU, presupposes that the social, 
economic and political fields rest on a legal-regulatory order. 
 
Arguably, this conception is largely shared by both neo-classical and Keynesian economists. 
Consider the following two quotes from F.A. Hayek:  
We can ‘plan’ a system of general rules, equally applicable to all people and 
intended to be permanent (even if subject to revision with the growth of 
knowledge), which provides an institutional framework within which the 
decisions as to what to do and how to earn a living are left to the individuals 
(Hayek 1939: 198-90) 
 
The functioning of competition not only requires adequate organization of certain 
institutions like money, markets, and channels of information – some of which 
can never be adequately provided by private enterprise – but it depends, above all, 
on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to 
preserve competition and to make it operate has beneficially as possible (Hayek 
1944: 43) 
 
By contrast with F.A. Hayek, J.M. Keynes supported a greater degree of state intervention to 
correct market disequilibria. However, it is equally true that both believed that markets could 
only work based on general rules upheld by states: mirroring the rule of law, economic rules 
need to be both a priori, fixed and a posteriori discretionary in order to combine 
predictability with the ability to respond to changing circumstances. This broad approach to 
economics shared by Hayek and Keynes is inscribed in a tradition of political liberalism and 
the moral theory of utilitarianism (Skidelsky 2006). In short, it is possible to conclude that 
neo-classical economics and Keynesianism share with ordo-liberalism a commitment to the 
primacy of the constitutional-legal order that grounds the economic, political and social 
fields. 
 
The reference to ordo-liberalism is not merely of conceptual or historical interest, as I have 
already hinted at. On the contrary, the ordo-liberal understanding of what it sees as the policy 
errors in the 1920s and 1930s shapes contemporary critiques of the global economy in general 
and the euro area in particular. In each case, ordo-liberalism views the failure properly to 
regulate bank lending and the concomitant excess of cheap credit as a major cause of the 
financial and euro crises. Linked to this is the set of distinctly ordo-liberal policy 
prescriptions, including austerity and automatic ‘debt brakes’ in order to bring about balanced 
budgets and competitive market equilibria. Indeed, ordo-liberalism regards any other type of 
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government intervention (such as a fiscal stimulus or the restructuring of debt) as a 
misallocation of resources that generates either bubbles (credit and property) or unsustainable 
aggregate demand (budget deficits) – or indeed both at once. From an ordo-liberal 
perspective, this applies not just to eurozone members such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain but also other economies like the USA, the UK and Iceland. 
 
Moreover, ordo-liberal economists insist on strict versions of moral hazard and the validity of 
Ricardo’s equivalence theorem. Applied to EMU, the former implies that bailouts of private 
or public sector debtors induce ever greater systemic risk-taking. The latter suggests that the 
artificial expansion of either aggregate demand (through activist fiscal policy such as deficit 
spending) or the money supply (through activist monetary policy such as ‘quantitative 
easing’) ends up producing the opposite outcome to the one intended. For rationally driven 
economic actors include in their calculation future hikes in tax and in price inflation, thereby 
depressing both spending and borrowing. For these reasons, ordo-liberalism advocates a 
rules-based management of both state spending and market liquidity in order to attain price 
stability and a competitive economic equilibrium. 
 
From this discussion, it is clear that there are fundamental differences with both neo-classical 
and Keynesian policy ideas. Neo-classical economists tend to believe that all markets, 
including financial markets, are ultimately self-correcting, while Keynesian economists 
usually assume that government intervention such as fiscal stimulus can prevent a sub-
optimal market equilibrium (e.g. insufficient aggregate demand and/or a liquidity trap as a 
result of the paradox of thrift). However, both share with ordo-liberalism the conception that 
the economic and political fields need to be firmly embedded in a constitutional-legal order in 
which the purpose of states is to remove obstacles to market competition and price 
movements. So like neo-classical economics and Keynesian thinking, ordo-liberalism 
brackets social relationships out of the picture. 
 
The effect of all three approaches to political economy is to disembed the economy and the 
polity from society and to re-embed social ties in the predominantly contractual relations that 
govern markets and states (Polanyi 1944). By contrast with some strands of modern 
economics and political sciences, the economic and political fields are mutually 
interdependent and intertwined with the social field, as I have already indicated. However, 
these various fields are all ultimately bound together by the constitutional-legal order, i.e. a 
set of principles, rules and regulations that are general and abstract, which assumes that social 
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ties are either homogenous or subordinate. 
 
As a result, the logic that underpins both the overarching ‘order’ and the ‘process’ favours 
those social relations which are compatible with the requirements of markets and states, i.e. 
relations that privilege instrumental rationality and utility maximisation over other forms of 
rational behaviour and the pursuit of other ends. In short, the various approaches such as 
ordo-liberalism, neo-classical economics and Keynesianism restrict the domain of political 
economy at the expense of complex, hybrid social ties on which trust and cooperation depend. 
The next section shows how this logic has shaped European integration and EMU from the 
outset. 
 
4. (Neo-)Functionalism and the Building of the European Polity 
 
Historically, the origins of the European Union go back to the inter-war years and the early 
post-1945 period. Initially, the experience of two world wars and the Great Depression of 
1929-32 convinced national leaders to create an ambitious supranational project, namely the 
European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) in 1952. 
The EDC sought to establish a pan-European defence force, while the EPC envisioned a 
supranational political system: a bicameral system composed of a directly elected parliament 
(‘the Peoples’ Chamber’) and a senate appointed by national assemblies, coupled with a 
supranational executive accountable to the parliament. 
 
Following the rejection of the EDC and the EPC by the French National Assembly in 1954, 
Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries settled for the more limited European 
Economic Community (EEC) that built on the cooperation of the 1951 European Coal and 
Steel Community. Indeed, the 1957 Rome Treaty, which established the EEC, enshrined a 
certain logic that views political union largely as the result of spill-over effects from 
economic integration (Wallace 1990). This (neo-)functional logic underpins the key 
milestones of economic integration, including the 1970 Werner Report (that laid the 
foundations for the ERM), the European single market (launched in 1985) and EMU 
(enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and launched in 1999).2 
 
Conceptually, the dominant logic of European integration has been (neo-)functionalism, 
which views closer regional and national ties in terms of three closely interacting factors:                                                         
2 Functionalism and neo-functionalism are not synonymous (inter alia, Groom and Taylor 1975; Haas 1961 and 
1964; Mitrany 1933, 1948; 1966, 1975 and 1976; Wolf 1973) but their differences do not alter my argument that 
both are compatible with the main precepts of ordo-liberalism. 
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first, positive spill-over effects from growing economic interdependence to greater political 
union; second, shared institutions to resolve disputes and build a common legal framework 
for states and markets; third, supranational market rules that replace national regulatory 
regimes (inter alia, Haas 1961; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1997; Sandholtz, Stone Sweet and 
Fligstein 2001). Thus, the (neo-)functionalist logic assumes that enhanced economic 
exchange and legal harmonisation will over time produce closer political cooperation and 
unification – an expression of the ordo-liberal argument that the economic and political fields 
are grounded in the constitutional-legal order. 
 
According to Ernst Haas, David Mitrany and other theorists of functionalism, there are three 
main mechanisms through which multi-level economic interdependence would produce 
political integration (Haas 1961 and 1964; Mitrany 1933, 1948, 1965, 1966 and 1976). First 
of all, positive spill-over effects. Such effects can be either functional or political or both 
once. Functional spill-over effects denote the interconnection of various economic sectors or 
issue-areas, and the integration in one policy-area spilling over into others because integration 
in one economic sector creates incentives and dynamics for integration in other sectors. 
Political spill-over effects refer to the creation of supranational governance models such as 
the EEC, the EC or later the EU – with supranational institutions like the Commission and the 
ECJ that create an integrative movement, which has been called ‘competence creep’. The 
combination of functional and political spill-over effects takes the form of an increased 
number of transactions and negotiations among member-states, which leads to the creation of 
supranational institutions that are increasingly disembedded from social connections at the 
local, regional and national levels. 
 
The second mechanism is a transfer in domestic allegiances to the supranational level, 
especially on the part of interest groups and associations that can better advance their own 
material interests at the supranational than the national level. Given the growing regulatory 
complexity and the lack of information at lower stations, both policy- and decision-making as 
well as implementation and oversight require supranational institutions – so the (neo-
)functional argument goes. Third, the dynamic of integration is such that functional spill-over 
effects, coupled with supranational institutions, produce an ever-greater process of 
technocratic automaticity. In this manner, supranational structures gain increasing agency, as 
their power and autonomy is self-reinforcing. Taken together, these three mechanisms imply 
that political union is an inevitable side effect of increasing integration in economic sectors 
within and across different states. 
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Jean Monnet’s method encapsulates the logic of (neo-)functionalism: unlike the other 
founding fathers of European integration such as Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schuman or 
Konrad Adenauer, he tended to eschew politics in favour of central administration and 
technical solutions. Monnet and other influential figures like Belgium’s leader Paul-Henri 
Spaak were primarily concerned with post-war reconstruction and economic growth through 
supranational rules. As such, Monnet’s method consisted in imposing centrally determined, 
abstract standards and formal mechanisms that had the effect of weakening the locally 
diverse, embodied and informal social connections that underpin both markets and states. In 
this manner, the actions of Monnet and Spaak ultimately drove a wedge between Europe’s 
supranational technocratic institutions and economic exchange, on the one hand, and local, 
regional and national political institutions and civic ties, on the other hand. 
 
Since the 1950s and 1960s, Monnet’s Community method has been supplemented by other 
mechanisms and instruments of closer integration, above all intergovernmental cooperation 
(inter alia, Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1998) and, more recently multinational 
governance and elements of a political system that is sui generis (Hix 2005). However, the 
(neo-)functionalist logic remains central to the process of European unification. All the main 
supranational institutions such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice 
are technocratic in design. The Commission in particular combines bureaucratic regulation 
with a managerialist approach to policy design and implementation. In principle, both the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers are more political in nature, but their 
pursuit of the common public good is severely restricted by ideological divisions and 
sectional interests. Functionalism is so pervasive that it continues to structure the EU’s entire 
ethos, developing “procedure as a substitute for policy” (Allen and Wallace 1977) – a 
characterisation that applies not only to the failed 1999 Lisbon Agenda but also to the 
eurozone crisis management since early 2010 (cf. Marsh 2012). 
 
At the same time, the EU’s modus operandi has led to an ever-growing degree of 
centralisation of decision- and policy-making and the concomitant transfer of competencies 
from localities, regions and nations to Brussels. For example, the imperative of common 
product standards as part of the single market entails a unitary, centralised system of 
bureaucratic regulation. That system is enforced by the Commission and policed by the Court 
of Justice. What this has done is to reduce the diversity of distinct goods and services based 
on specific skills in different parts of Europe. It has also had the effect of undermining self-
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regulation and mutual control within the framework of guilds or other voluntary professional 
associations.  
 
Moreover, the (neo-)functionalist approach championed by Monnet and his political heirs has 
favoured a concentration of wealth and productive assets. The single market has tended to put 
a premium on economies of scale and thereby favoured large producers over small- and 
medium-sized enterprise. This is true for sectors as diverse as agriculture, manufacturing, 
industry, retail or financial services. Neither EU competition policy aimed at avoiding cartels 
and monopolistic practices nor EU subsidies has achieved a proper balance between small and 
large businesses and a diversified economy which reflects the diverse talents of the European 
population as a whole. 
 
Thus, there is a gulf between Monnet’s neo-functionalist method to deliver an overarching 
political project, on the one hand, and the scale of the common economic challenges, on the 
other hand. Cross-border financial ties, economic exchange and legal harmonisation – so the 
neo-functionalist argument goes – are primary precisely because they are the most appropriate 
foundations for a supranational polity. But with political integration lagging behind, neo-
functionalism has over time reinforced the modern ‘disembedding’ of the economic field 
from the social field and a re-embedding of social relations in economic transactions (Polanyi 
1944). In the case of Europe, this is exemplified by the single, bureaucratically regulated 
market that has taken precedence over a shared political culture, social solidarity and 
environmental sustainability. 
 
Linked to this priority is a tendency to privilege the convergence of national states and 
transnational markets over an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” – the original 
ambition of the Rome Treaties as enshrined in the preamble. In this manner, the 
predominance of the functionalist logic, which has governed European integration since the 
failure of the EDC and the EPC, helps explain why the single currency lacks a robust political 
project that can correct the design faults of the euro such as the lack of a banking union and a 
fiscal union – two commitments that require much greater supranational coordination and 
authority than the EMU’s current governance structure allows. 
 
As such, one alternative to (neo-)functionalism is not to create a federal super-state but rather 
to promote the associative ties that bind together countries and peoples – the social practices, 
customs and traditions that provide the glue for European (and international) society. As a 
matter of observation, the EU is neither a Franco-German federalist super-state nor a purely 
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Anglo-Saxon glorified ‘free-trade’ area. Rather, the Union – despite its many imperfections – 
is perhaps best described as a neo-medieval polity with a political system sui generis. Indeed, 
Europe’s polity is characterised by hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, multiple 
membership, polycentric authority and multi-level governance (Hix 2005; Zielonka 2007). 
 
Within this polity, social relations are hybrid, not monolithic, i.e. not just vertical and 
instrumental but also horizontal and non-instrumental. Connected with this is the fusion of 
intended with non-intended outcomes and of homogeneous with heterogeneous 
interdependence. The question is whether ordo-liberal and (neo-)functionalist approaches are 
compatible with the diversity of the social domain on which the economic and political fields 
ultimately depend for trust and cooperation that are necessary for the functioning of EMU. 
 
5. Constitutional Political Economy and Alternative Pathways for the Eurozone 
 
Since the outbreak of the eurozone crisis in early 2010, four different scenarios have been 
discussed both in academic research and public policy making. First of all, a full break-up and 
a return to national currencies. Second, a partial break-up that could take three forms: either a 
core euro area without the peripheral countries, or Germany’s exit, or a northern and a 
southern eurozone with different exchange rates and different interest rates. Third, an 
increasing centralisation of decision-making based on a combination of intergovernmental 
and supranational elements (e.g. creating a banking, fiscal and political union). Fourth, a full 
federalisation of the entire eurozone with a joint finance ministry, centralised taxation and 
other key features of a single state. 
 
Arguably, ordo-liberalism supports the third scenario while neo-functionalism champions the 
fourth scenario. By limiting the options to a (partial or full) break-up or to a variant of 
supranational centralisation, both the ordo-liberal and the neo-functional approach to the 
political economy of the eurozone restrict the range of possible pathways for the common 
currency. All these pathways fail to resolve the crisis because they neither work on their own 
terms nor address the structural issues as outlined above. 
 
Ordo-liberalism advocates three objectives that are mutually incompatible: first, maintaining a 
stable euro internally and externally (no more than 2 per cent price inflation and limited 
fluctuations vis-à-vis major global currencies); second, securing the viability of the European 
banking system, in particular German banks; third, preserving the fiscal sovereignty of the 
core, creditor countries by ruling out debt mutualisation and a ‘transfer union’ of cross-
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national fiscal support for the peripheral, debtor states. 
 
In the case of EMU, it is possible to pursue any two of these three objectives but impossible 
to achieve all three simultaneously and in full. The reasons is that without either a measure of 
debt mutualisation or fiscal transfers (in the form of debt restructuring), the debtor states 
would default, which would lead to a significant drop of the euro against other currencies. In 
turn, this would increase inflationary pressures and force the ECB to raise interest rates, 
thereby reducing economic growth and raising both public deficits and national debt. The 
threat of sovereign defaults would also bring about another banking crisis, as Europe’s banks 
are the single largest holders of sovereign bonds. According to some estimates, German banks 
alone hold about €350 billion worth of sovereign bonds denominated in Euros, which 
represents 15 per cent of German national output. 
 
Moreover, the deleveraging of Europe’s largest banks, coupled with the new capital 
requirements of the Basel III agreement, is accelerating and amplifying capital flight from the 
periphery to the core, which is exacerbating the balance of payments disequilibrium. The 
mutual dependence of overleveraged banks and highly indebted states creates a vicious circle 
of bail-outs, rising debt, deleveraging, illiquidity, insolvency and further bail-outs (cf. Bibow, 
2012). 
 
To break out of this vicious circle that could bring down the entire euro area, different 
pathways compared with the ordo-liberal and neo-functional approaches are needed. In this 
context, the ‘proximity model’ of the political economy of civil society (Pabst and Scazzieri 
2012) can help devise alternative political economies. The mark of the proximity model is to 
embed the complex process of production and exchange in a set of social ties that are 
characterised by partially realised connections and multiple dimensions of interaction. 
Accordingly, both political institutions and market arrangements take shape within a social 
domain that avoids the choice between the largely vertical relationships within the political 
field and the predominantly horizontal relationships within the economic field. By focusing 
on the complex, hybrid social ties, constitutional political economy favours alternative 
pathways that combine the endurance of general social connectivity (over time and across 
space) with the flexibility of arrangements which are specific to particular periods and places. 
 
In policy terms, such an approach would seek to resolve the eurozone crisis and transform the 
common currency in the following ways. First of all, it would tie the recapitalisation of 
Europe’s over-indebted and under-capitalised (including the highly indebted regional banks 
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such as the Spanish cajas and the German Landesbanken) to increased lending to the large 
number of small- and medium-size enterprise that are starved of capital and have much 
greater needs than large businesses. Such a recapitalisation could be done out of an expanded 
European Stability Mechanism in which both eurozone members and the ECB have stakes.  
 
Second, the perspective to which this chapter adheres can help reconfigure fiscal policy. It 
would abandon pro-cyclical fiscal policy (as a result of the 2011 fiscal pact and the ‘debt 
brake’) in favour of some measure of debt restructuring (both public and private) and a shift 
in government spending from consumption to investment in productive activities (including 
sectors with a higher multiplier such as high-tech manufacturing). 
 
Third, constitutional political economy and the ‘proximity model’ offer possible pathways for 
a growth strategy based on several components, including (i) a credit policy that channels 
bank lending into small- and medium-sized enterprise and other businesses currently starved 
of capital; (ii) a European strategy for boosting investment in transport, energy, information 
and communication networks as well as in education and R&D by creating project bonds and 
using instruments such as risk-sharing finance facilities or loan guarantees. Project bonds 
could attract institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and perhaps 
even sovereign wealth funds; (iii) promoting innovation to raise both labour and capital 




The constitutional political economy that this chapter outlines has far-reaching implications 
for the eurozone. First of all, it offers a structural analysis that describes and explains the 
multi-level dependencies of the political and the social domain, which is irreducible to the 
economic and monetary field. Instead, the focus is on the social ties that underpin both state 
laws and market contracts. 
 
Second, the constitutional political economy which this chapter develops transcends the 
separation of micro processes from macro outcomes that characterises conventional 
approaches, including neo-classical, monetarist and Keynesian theories. Thus, it rejects the 
sole emphasis on the impersonal links of laws and contracts in favour of interpersonal social 
ties, which pre-exist patterns of conflict and cooperation. 
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Third, constitutional political economy and the proximity model view systems and structures 
in non-deterministic ways without ignoring path dependencies that provide constraints on 
crisis management/resolution and fundamental reforms. In this manner, it offers alternative 
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